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CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

v.
DUKES

~from
~~~~e~r~g~,

CA 5

?, ?)1/

Federal/Civil

Summary:

The City of New Orleans attacks the holding of the

Fifth Circuit that a New Orleans ordinance which restricted vendor
permits for the sale of hot dogs in the French Quarter to those

·- ------------------=--------

who

h~d

lawfully been in the business more than eight years :is

1/The names of the other members of the Fifth Circuit panel aren't
specified.

'.

-2-

unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as creating a
statutory classification without rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.

Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. - 457, 463-64.

Appellant City argues the statutory classification is rationally
related to various legitimate objectives.
Facts:

Appellee Dukes maintained a pushcart business in

the Vieux Carre (French Quarter) in New Orleans for about a year
prior to January 1, 1972.

On that date the New Orleans City

Council revised its ordinances, removing hot dog vendors from
the list o£ permitted pushcart enterprises in the Vieux Carre
but simultaneously allowing all licensed vendors who had
conti~uously

operated there for over eight years pr3.or to

------._

-

y

January 1, 1972 to continue selling.

---.,

---- ___________,

The only peddler to

actually qualify for a Vieux Carre permit was a firm called

-

Lucky Dogs, Inc.

When other hot dog vendors who were friends

of Dukes were arrested for operating in the Vieux Carre and
when she was unable to obtain a permit for the area, she filed
suit in USDC (E.D. La.)

(Gordon) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201,

2202

arguing that the municipal ordinances were unconstitutional

1/828 MCS 46-1 does not include the sale of hot dogs in the Vieux Carre
as an approved activity although the sale of hot dogs is allowed in other
places. However, 828 MCS 46-1.1 added on the same day that the Vjeux
Carre was removed from the approved list provides that "vendors who have
continuously operated within that area .•• [with a permit] for eight years
prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a ••• permit to operate" the business
within the area of the Vieux Carre.

\
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and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.

On stipulated

facts the USDC, finding no issues of fact, granted judgment
for the City.

The CA reversed, holding the statutory "grandfather

clause" irrational under the test of Morey, supra, and hence unconstitutional.
Jurisdiction:

Appellant City seeks to appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(2) which provides for review by this Court of cases in the
courts of appeal:
"By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by
a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the
constitution ••• but such appeal shall preclude review
by writ of certiorari at the instance of such appellant."
The enactment in question is a city ordinance -- not an enactment
<---------,·
.
of statewide application.
In contrast to appeals from three-judge

----

federal courts where "state statute" requires a state enactment of
statewide application [Cases collected in Stern & Gressman,
Supreme Court Practice§ 2.14, p. 49-51], a line of cases have

-

held that "state statute" for the purpose of§ 1254(2) jurisdiction

--------------

includes municipal ordinances.

See Id. at § 2.6, p. 32; United

Gas Co. v. ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135; Chicago v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. R. Co., 357

u.s.

77, 82.

These cases appear controlling

unless the logic of cases such as Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees
Credit Union,
·'-.......--'•

~-·

u.s.

(1974)

indicate that this anomalous

interpretation ought to yield to the policy factors expressed jn

·.

-4Gonzalez.

If the case is not a proper appeal, it may be treated

as a petition for cert even though it was brought under§ 1254(2).
Bradfort Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U.S. 221,
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 501-503.

224;

The preclusion clause

in§ 1254(2) applies only if the case is actually considered by
this Court as an appeal.
Contentions:

The Fourteenth Amendment doesn't outlaw clas-

sification -- only irrational discrimination.

"A statutory

discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it."
420 (1961).

McGowan v. Maryland, 366

u.s.

New Orleans and the nation have a vital interest in

preserving the Vieux Carre as a place of beauty and as a historical
landmark.

The New Orleans City Council observed the Quarter was

being overrun by hawkers and peddlers in substantial numbers
whose rude assaults on sightseers and tourists alike were destroying
the nature of the Quarter and its economic contribution in attracting
tourists.

The traditional hot dog peddler of the Quarter, Lucky

Dogs, for many years has used decorative carts which have become
a part of the beauty of New Orleans.

This statutory classification

suitably furthered an appropriate governmental interest.

Further

,.~.a.) ,.$

~bt~i· any burden imposed on appellee Dukes is de minimis:
~t CUCA-

!!t~.

'-../ "'.:::=t

the entire

except for the Vieux Carre is available for her business.

tD\a.ce..- .,
~~~~~

Although Lucky Dogs is the only peddler who actually qualified

~,_

~~'~

to use the Quarter under the grandfather clause, not all legislative

-5monopolies fall.
538 (1934)

Under Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529-530,

such monopolies will be upheld where because of

scarcity of space or other legitimate reasons the grant of such
monopoly is a rational choice.

Here large numbers of peddlers

are incompatible with the historic nature of the Vieux Carre.
In such circumstances the grandfather clause even if construed as
the grant of a legislative monopoly is a rational choice and
hence satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.
The CA found the "traditional" equal protection test of Morey
v. Doud, supra, applicable.

:\._..I

this ordinance falls.

However on the authority of that case

Like American Express in Morey, there is

no showing here that Lucky Dogs or other traditional peddlers wjll
operate in a manner more consistent with the traditions of the
Quarter than any other peddler.

In the same way that the exemption

of American Express from future regulation was irrational because
there were no guarantees of its future performance, the grant of
an effective legislative monopoly to Lucky Dogs falls here.
Stanley v. Public Utilities Comm'n,

295

u.s.

76 which upheld the

grant of a legislative monopoly is of no aid to appellant since
there the legislative scheme was directed towards permitting only
qualified applicants to do business and held open the possjbility
of licences for future qualified applicants unlike this scheme
which totally eliminates the possibility of future entry.

There

are many other valid legislative means to the accomplishment of

•,.

~1i

.

... •

- 6-

.I

the end s s o ught by New Orle ans but the instant "grandfather
clau s e " falls as irratio nal.
Di s c ussion:
way.

See

(1947).

~,

On the merit s there are good arguments either
Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552

The analogy by theCA to Morey v. Doud, supra, is not

a complete one and Morey does not necessarily control the instant
case.
The ca se off ers an opportunity to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Court by interpreting "state statute" as used in
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) in the same way as it is interpreted under
28 U.S.C. § 1253 -- an enactment of statewide application.
The case probably warrants calling for a Motion to Affirm/
Dismiss from appellees.
There is no Motion to Affirm/Dismiss.
O'Neill

1/27/75

·,

'.
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I am inclined to agree with the
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-
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noeewriter!~suggestion that

"state statute" under 1254(2) should be restricted

to enactments of statewide application.

It seems absurd to hold

that consideration of city ordinances of this ,rtype fall within
the Court's mandatory jurisdiction.
On the merits, I think the CA was wrong. Grandfather clauses

are by nature somewhat irrational; the only real issue is how far
back the clause should reach. That's aw:t:XAXijW&:tiamzai

generally an

issue that reveolves around politics rather than the merits of
the"' various competitors. v

I ·

1

If this caee were arising an

cert, however, I'd deny cert. It's not a very important case. In
any event, the Vieux Carre is a zoo and the addition of a few more
hotdog venders will only make life for fat people like me easier.
t-z__
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No.

74-775

-,

(___

v.
DUKES
The Court postponed jurisdiction over this appeal from CA 5.

The sub-

stantive is sue raised involves the constitutionality of a New Orleans ordinance
restricting vendor permits for the~ale of hotdogs in the French Quar§j}to those

to ~'-{eJ
~

who had !awfully been in the business more than
j

~

appellee 1 s motion to proceed IFF. -

'bJ3

ei~t

years.

The Court granted

•

Appellee 1 s counsel, Joseph Neves :tv1arcal1 III1 Esquire of Louisiana, now
moves that he be appointed to represent appellee before this Court.
-

.....::was . . ...,.,..., ........

,....,

"'"""-'='

11

first as General Counsel for the La. ACLU and now as a

I,

'----""-

-.c:==

Mr. 1v1arcal 1

referral attorney,

' ..

11

-

has

represented appclJee without con1.pensation since tbe case was appealed to CA 5.
~ ~
-=: ::

·=

=

..

·

..
'

·'

'

'·

.

"permit law" in issue here and is "also very :familiar with so-called 1 civil rights
litigation1 , of the type represented by the controversy before the Court herein,
all of which involves 1 invidious discrin1inatlon 1 practice by State authorities.
Counsel is a

----=:;;'

mem~ber

of the bar of this Court.

ably qualified to brief and orall
DISCUSSION:

He submits that he is

m~ore

11

than

argue this matter before the Courto

This is not a Criminal Justice Act case.

controlled by 28 U. So C. 1915 and Rule 53(7).

The motion is

The standard appears to be indigency

not inability to pay, and the only compensation involved is transportation and
~

die1n expenses.
One obvious problem with the instant motion is that it is filed by counsel,

by counsel.
>

<::_

It would seem that appellee should be heard from on the 1natter.

Although it is som.ewhat after the :fact, there is also the question of whether
appellee qualifies for IFP treatment.

Appellee is styled both here and below

as "Nancy Dukes, cUb/a Louisiana Concessions'' and the Court has traditionalJy

~~--

denied IFP status to artificial per sons.
~

..........

One final problem is that although appellee

in regards to her response

state appellee 1 s inability to obtain counsel, although the latter might be inferred,
Appellee does not appear to have been granted IFP status below.

The affidavit

notes, however, that CA 5 (Goldberg) pennitted appellee to proceed on typewritten
transcripts and typewritten briefs.
The Court

lTii;Y

wish to reconsid;;r the motion to proceed IFP or, at least

_,___

n1otion by appellee
and seck further finan d al in onnation or tl1e type rcqunea
_....
by Form 4, Fed. R. App. P.
There is no response.
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August 26, 1975

No. 74-775, City of New Orleans v. Dukes.

The purpose of this memo, dictated during the summer,
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the
opinions and briefs.

* * * * * * *
This is the New Orleans "hot dog" vending case.

A

1972 ordinance restricted vendor permits for the sale of hot
dogs by pushcart in the Vieux Carre (Latin Quarter) to vendors
who had lawfully been in this business more then eight years.
At the time of this enactment, there were only two
licensed hot dog vendors operating in the Latin Quarter:

Nancy

Dukes, who had operated there in a small way for less than two
years; and Lucky Dogs, Inc., that had conducted this business
in the Latin Quarter for about twenty years.

The effect of this

provision of the ordinance was to preclude Dukes from the pushcart selling of hot dogs in the Latin Quarter, leaving Lucky
Dogs with a monopoly.
A Dukes salesman was arrested for violating the ordinance,
but the charge was dismissed.

*

Thereafter~,

Dukes instituted a

The appendix (2 volumes) in this case is so fouled up, and the
briefs are so poor, that I find it difficult to be sure of the
facts.
I believe that the arrest warrant against Dukes : employee
was dismissed prior to the institution of this suit.

No. 74-77S

2.

§ 1983 suit in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment

and an injunction, alleging denial of equal protection and of due
process under the federal constitution.
The DC decided the case on cross summary judgment motions,
sustaining the validity of the ordinance.

I do not think the

DC filed a written opinion, and there are no stipulated facts.
CAS (Goldberg) reversed, holding that there was no
rational basis for the "grandfather clause" which allowed Lucky
Dogs to remain in business while precluding Dukes.

CAS rejected

Dukes' argument that the "compelling state interest" test applied.
It found that there was no rational basis for the discrimination
against Dukes, relying primarily on Morey v. Doud, 3S4 U.S. 4S7,
463-64 (19S7).

CAS noted, after recognizing the authority of

New Orleans to make some economic discriminations, that the
grandfather clause in this ordinance was "facially unusual

in

that its establishment of a closed class of favored enterprises"
is supported "solely by the length of their tenure as established
operations."

The city argued, as it still does, that Lucky Dogs'

long continued operation was a part of the tradition of the Latin
Quarter.

In rejecting this argument, CAS said:
the hypothesis that a present eight year
veteran of the pushcart hot dog market • • •
will continue to operate in a manner more
consistent with the traditions of the
Quarter than any other operator is without
foundation.

No. 74-775

3.

Appealability
The first issue presented is whether this is a proper
appeal under 28

u.s.c.

§ 1254(2), providing for review by this

Court:
by appeal by a party relying on a state
statute held by a Court of Appeals to be
invalid as repugnant to the Constitution
The question is whether a city ordinance is, for purposes of§ 1254(2), a "state statute."

As a matter of semantics,

the answer would appear to be plainly negative.

This view is

supported, also, by the fact that appeals from three-judge
federal courts from the invalidating of a "state statute" require
a state enactment of state-wide application.

Nevertheless, there

appear to be decisions of this Court which hold that "state
statutes" include municipal ordinances for the purpose of jurisdiction under§ 1254(2).
369

u.s.

See United Gas Co. v. Ideal Cement Co.,

134, 135.
In view, however, of our decision in Gonzales v. Auto-

matic Employees Credit Union (1975), in which we limited the scope
of three-judge court appeals in light of the basic purpose of this
jurisdiction, I think I would join four other justices in applying
the "plain language" test to§ 1254(2).
"state statutes" to mean precisely that.

That is, I would construe

4.

No. 74-775
Merits

Even if we conclude that an appeal does not confer
jurisdiction, I believe we have the option to treat the appeal
as a petition for certiorari.

Finality?
A further question raised by appellee is whether the
judgment of CAS is final.

Although the ordinance was held to

be unconstitutional, the case was remanded to the district court
to determine whether the entire pushcart vending ordinance is
invalid, or whether merely the grandfather clause portion thereof
is invalid.

If the district court invalidates the grandfather

clause, all hot dog vendors would be denied permits to operate.
Subject to further consideration, and despite my general
reluctance to liberalize the finality requirement,

it does seem

to me that the critical constitutional question has been resolved
finally against the city.

Merits
If we reach the merits, I view the question as quite
close.

Judge Goldberg',s opinion is persuasive.

It is "unusual,"

I believe, for a "grandfather clause" not to include all persons
already within what fairly may be characterized as "the class."
Here, the

ba~ic

class included pushcart vendors of hot dogs in the

No. 74-775

5.

Latin Quarter.

There were only two of these, one who had been

there nearly twenty years and one less than two years.

Both

were duly qualified to sell hot dogs prior to enactment of this
ordinance.

As Judge Goldberg noted, on its face the ordinance

is discriminatory without a self-evident legitimate purpose.
For the most part, the city's brief reads like it was
written by the chamber of commerce.

But putting this type of

rhetoric aside, a substantial argument is made for the view that
Lucky Dogs had in fact become a part of the "atmosphere" for
which the Latin Quarter is famous.

It is argued that this vendor

has been selling hot dogs "from distinctive little carts, which
are actually enlarged model versions of the product itself;" that
these carts are attractive and appealing to tourists; are frequently photographed and described in literature about the French
Quarter:
Postcards showing sight in the Vieux Carre
invariably will contain the carts and their
costumed attendants.
(Appellant's brief
p. 21.)
On the "monopoly" issue, the city argues:
The alleged monopoly in the case at bar was
incidentally created by the city in its effort
to maintain, as is, its main tourist attraction.
The questioned grandfather clause is illustrative
of the desire, not to favor particular businesses,
but to maintain only those features which over
the years, over a score of years in this case,
have become landmarks in this area of the city
of New Orleans.
(City's brief p. 31.)

No. 74-775

6.

The foregoing type of argument, if in fact supported
by the record, is not necessarily irrational.

If indeed Lucky

Dogs' vending of hot dogs over a twenty-year period has resulted
in the creation of something akin to a "secondary meaning" for
its particular type of operation, perhaps the city does have a
legitimate interest in preserving it.

Putting it differently,

the city legitimately could limit the number of vending operations
on these streets, and it may rationally have concluded -- if the
facts justified it -- that only Lucky Dogs was truly compatible
with the atmosphere for which the French Quarter is famous.
My difficulty with the city's argument is that, the
case having been decided on summary judgment and with inadequate
affidavits, I am by no means sure as to its factual accuracy.
This is certainly not a "great case," and I may conclude
that it can be decided either way without doing violence to
principled equal protection analysis.

BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

C~rl

Schenker

DATE:

No. 74-775

October 21, 1975

New Orleans v. Dukes

This case presents two questions:

(1)

Is a municipal

ordinance a "state statute" for purposes of the § 1254(b)
appellate jurisdiction?

(2)

Did New Orleans' grandfather

clause violate equal protection by excluding some preexisting
operators from the closed class?
1.

Jurisdiction

To clear the underbrush, we can ignore appellee's
claim that the judgment below is insufficiently "final" for
purposes of review under§ 1254(b).
final enough.

I agree with you that

i~s

Besides, it may be doubted that finality is

really required.

It is true that finality has been held to be

required by§ 1254(b).

(Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U.S. 188, 189.)

But the statutory language does not compel this result, and the
requirement is probably erroneous.

In Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.

F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, the Court asked for briefing about whether
the finality requirement should be r etained but failed to reach
the issue.

Even if the judgment is not final, the finality

requirement could be jettisoned in this case (if an appeal
otherwise lies) (The appellant did bri ef this point.)
~

2.

The real jurisdictional issue is whether "state statute"
in § 1254(b) should be given the narrow "statewide statute"
reading that prevails in § 1253 (three-judge court) cases.
My sympathies lie with yours on the desirability of doing
a "Gonzalez" on§ 1254(b), but I think it would be a much
tougher row to hoe than was Gonzalez.

Apparently ther e is

only one precedent squarely in point.

In Chicago v. Atchison,

supra, the Court took § 1254(b) jurisdiction in a case involving
a municipal ordinance.

(It should be noted, however, that this

was done without discussion.)

But there are other

cases in which § 1254(b) jurisdiction has been taken that did
not involve

statutetof statewide application.

More importantly,

the case law under § 1257(2) is replete with precedent for the

---

proposition that a municipal ordinance is a "state statute"
for appellate purposes.

And the Court once so held after giving

pl~nary consideration to that specific issue (over a vigorous

dissent from Holmes and Brandeis).

There's the rub.

Section 1257(2) is a rough converse of§ 1254(b).

It

provides for appeals when a state court upholds a "state statute"
against a claim of infirmity.

Section 1257(2) is of considerably

longer lineage than § 1254(b) because the federal circuit courts
of appeal are a r a ther recent creation.

From 1789 until 1925

an appeal lay from state courts under predecessors of § 1257(2)
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute
of, or of an authority exercised under, any State
and the decision is in favor of its validity.

3.
Under this statute it was frequently held that appeals lay
from state decisions sustaining the validity of municipal
ordinances, but those decisions could be rested on the "authority
exercised under" clause.

Then in 1925, the statute was amended.

(The date is important because the amending statute also
introduced§ 1254(b).)

As amended, the predecessor read

essentially as it does today, allowing appeal .
where is drawn in question the validity of a
statute of any State . . • and the decision is
in favor of its validity.
In King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S.
100 (1928), the Court considered whether deletion of the
"authority exercised under" clause meant that appeals no longer
lay in municipal ordinance cases.

The conceded purpose of

the 1925 legislation was to cut down the obligatory jurisdiction
of the court.

Nonetheless, the majority concluded that municipal

ordinances were "statutes of any state."

(The theory is that

it is up to the state to determine how its law making authority
will be exercised:
authority.)

a lot of state statutes or a lot of delegated

Justices Holmes and Brandeis howled in dissent,

complaining about how burdensome such trivial municipal ordinance
cases were.

But their complaints were to no avail.

The same statute amending the predecessor of § 1257(2)
enacted the predecessor of § 1254(b).

The predecessor read:

Any case in a circuit court of appeals where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of an¥
state . . • and the decision is against its valid1ty,
may . . . be taken to the Supreme Court for review on
• . . appeal.

4.
Today the statute reads:
Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court . . . (b) By appeal by a party
relying on a state statute held by a court of
appeals to be repugnant to the Constitution . .
The change in structure and the substitution of "state statute"
for "statute of any state" carne with the 1948 codification.
the reviser~ note attributes

But

no significance to these

formal changes, and I'll eat this memorandum if there is any.
Thus:

Section

1257(2) governs one head of appellate

jurisdiction and was amended the same year § 1254(b) was introduced
with the same "statute of any state" language.

There is a

precedent (King) a n the books that holds a municipal ordinance
to be a "statute of any state" for purposes of§ 1257(2).

Ergo

the Court must either (1) hold a municipal ordinance to be a
s tate statute for purposes of § 1254(b) or (2) overrule King
(or distinguish King disingenuously).
Overruling King wouldn't come as e(.'slly as the change of
\ direction in Gonzalez.

Obviously the incentive for reading

"state statute" not to include municipal ordinances is to get
these trivial cases off the Court's obligatory docket.

Similar

thoughts led to the "statewide statute" reading of the threejudge court statute.

But in the case of the three-judge court

statutory scheme, legislative history and other provisions
supported the exclusion of municipal-ordinance cases.

(See Ex

parte Collins, 277 U.S. 551 (decided in the same volume as King).
Not so here (especially while King stands).

Secondly, if "state

5.

statute" (§ 1254(b)) or "statute of any state" (§ 1257(2))
doesn't include municipal ordinancesfor appellate purposes,
the concept will have to be given another meaning for certiorari
purposes.

This would be required because § 1257(3) provides for

review by cert "where the validity of a State statute is drawn
in question" and the decision is against its validity.
I think any argument that § 1254(b) can be construed
differently than § 1257(2) would be rather weak.

I suppose one

could say that the purpose of § 1257(2) is to assure that state
courts are not niggardly in their interpretation of federal
law, while that problem is not presented by § 1254(b) cases.
Therefore the substantive policies served by the two jurisdictional
statutes would support a distinction by which more cases were let
in by appeal under§ 1257(2) than under§ 1254(b).

But one

purpose of the 1925 Act in general was to cut down on the workload
of the Court.

And if municipal ordinances are included in "statute

of any state," there obviously are going to be more § 1257(2)
appeals than § 1254(b) appeals.

In light of that purpose, it could

be argued that § 1257(2) should be construed more narrowly rather
than more broadly than§ 1254(b).

Further,

invalidatio~of

state

or municipal legislation by court s of appeals pose federalism
problems that argue in favor of a broad interpretation of§ 1254(b).
~~

~

In sum, I think its possible but extremely tough to exclude
municipal ordinances from the operation of§ 1154(b).

6.

2.

The Merits.

If a better man or woman than I can find a rationale
supporting a "Gonzalez" approach to§ 1254(b), there would be
no appellate jurisdiction here.

If the case ends up in that

posture I think the Court should promptly deny cert.

(As David

Boyd noted on the pool memo, this case is not certworthy.)
As to the merits of the merits, I agree with you that
the case as presented to CA 5 is more or less a toss up.
think the CA 5 opinion is persuasive, however.

I

It is a careful

and narrow holding, simply asking the City to do something to show
that the statutory scheme relates rationally to the alleged
purpose of conserving the atmosphere of the Vieux Carre.

I

thus think the case is "affirmable" and probably should be
affirmed if the merits must be reached.
I am not sure that the case is properly "reversible."

As

you note in your aid-to-memory, the City relies heavily on its
"preserve the Vieux Carre• rationale.

But appellees brief

states that the statutory scheme has been expanded to cover an
) area twice as large as the Vieux Carre.

(See Brief at 15-16.)

If the area covered is twice as large as the Vieux Carre, the
City would not seem to have articulated reasons in support of its
statute.

As I read your equal protection opinions, you are the

leading exponent of "articulated reasons" on the Court.

Thus

I don't think you would want to reverse this statute on the
"Vieux Carre" rationale if much more than the Vieux Carre is covered.

7.

CA 5 did not address this problem.

It cites the 1972

"Vieux Carre" ordinance when describing the grandfather clause.
(See footnote 1).

The text of this ordinance is found at

Appellee's Brief at Appendix M.
however, was passed in 1973.

The ordinance now on the books,

It is reproduced at Appellant's

Brief at 3 and Appellee's Brief at Appendix Q.

TheCA 5 opinion

was dated September 24, 1974.

It's a mystery to me why CA 5

did't consider the amendment.

In any event, the broader

coverage makes reversal seem inappropriate.

If the Court were

not inclined to affirm, it should at most remand for consideration
of the statute's constitutionality in light of the present
scope of the statute.

(I think affirmance would be appropriate

despite the change of the area covered because the geography
is f ar less crucial to affirmance than to reversal.)

You might

want to pursue this whole matter at oral argument.
SUMMARY
(1)

There is appellate jurisdiction.

(2)

Affirm or remand for consideration in light of the

present statutory framework.
Carl

October 25, 1975
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I dictate this memorandum after having reviewed the
file, and again taken at look at the briefs (among the worst
I have seen!), to record the following:
1.

Finality.

was decided below.

The constitutionality of the ordinance
The case is certainly sufficiently final

for review under§ 1254(2).
2.

Jurisdiction.

The case comes to us as an appeal

from CAS under§ 1254(2).

That section provides for appeal

from a decision of courts of appeal where a "state statute"
has been held unconstitutional.

The question is whether

a city ordinance is a state statute for purposes of 1254(2).
There is substantial authority for the view that an
ordinance may be deemed a state statute for this purpose.
King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100; and Chicago v.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, 357 U.S. 77 (where the Court
assumed 1254(2) jurisdiction without discussion).
Unless four other Justices wish to reexamine these
authorities, I suppose I should accept them.

My preference,

if writing on a clean slate, would be to construe 1254(2)
in the same manner as § 1253 (three judge court) jurisdiction
is construed, that is narrowly to require a statute of statewide application.

But, for reasons indicated in Carl's memo

of October 21, this is not a promising prospect.

2.
3.

Merits.

As indicated in my summer memo of August

26, this case is a real "sport" and if it were a cert it
should never have been taken.

I

am basically indifferent

as to how the merits are decided, as I think a feeble argument and not much more - can be made on either side of the equal
protection issue.
On balance, I will vote to affirm on the merits.
city's "chamber of commerce" argument with respect to
preservation of the atmosphere of Vieux Carre is not
impressive.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

The
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm
No. 74:-775
City of New Orleans et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeal from the United
States Court of Appeals
v.
for the Fifth Circuit.
Nancy Dukes, dba Louisiana Concessions.
[January -, 1976]
MR.

JusTICE

BRENNAN

delivered the opmwn of the

Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the
provision of a New Orleans ordinance, as amended in
1972, that excepts from the ordinance's prohibition
against vendors' selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in
the Vieux Carre, or French Quarter, "vendors who have
continually operated the same business within the Vieux
Carre ... for eight years prior to January 1, 1972 . .. "
denied appellee vendor equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
Appellee operates a vending business from pushcarts
throughout New Orleans but had carried on that business in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the
ordinance was amended in 1972 and barred her from
1

The pertinent provision of the New Orleans ordinance, c. 46,

§§ 1 and 1.1 of the Code of the City of New Orleans, as amended
August 31, 1972, provides :
"Vendors who have continuously operated the same business within
the Vieux Carre under the authority of this Cha.p ter for eight
or more years prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a valid permit
to operate such business within the Vieux Carre."

'i 4-775-0PINION
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continuing operations there. 2 She had previously filed
an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana attacking the validity of the former version
of the ordinance, 8 and amended her complaint to challenge the application of the ordinance's "grandfather
clause"-the eight years or more provision-as a denial
of equal protection. She prayed for an injunction and
declaratory judgment. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the District Court, without opinion, granted
appellant city's motion. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed. 501 F. 2d 706 (1974) . We
postponed the question of this Court's jurisdiction to a
hearing on the merits, 421 U. S. 908 (1975). We hold
that we have jurisdiction of appellant's appeal, and on
the merits reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Vieux Carre--the "French Quarter"-of the city
of New Orleans is the heart of that city's considerable
tourist industry and an integral component of the city's
economy. 4 The sector plays a special role in the city's
life, and pursuant to the Louisiana State Constitution,
c. 8 of Art. V of the City's Home Rule Charter grants
the New Orleans City Council power to enact ordinances
designed to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and
economic viability
Chapter 46 of the Code of the City of New Orleans sets
up a comprehensive scheme of permits for the conduct
of various businesses in the city. In 1972, the Code was
amended to restrict the validity of many of these per2 Most of appellee's sales, particularly during the summer months,
were made in the Vicux Carre.
8 JurisdiCtion was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343
(3) (4), and 2201-2202. The Equal ProtectiOn violation was alleged
to constitute a vwlation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985.
4 See generally App. Vol. II, at 31-63 (Excerpts from Comprehensive Study Plan for the Vieux Carre Under a Demonstration
Grant from Department of Housmg and Urba.n Development) .

1·
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mits to points outside the Vieux Carre. However, even
as to those occupations-including all pushcart food
vendors-which were to be banned from the Vieux Carre
during seasons other than Mardi Gras, the city council
made the "grandfather provision" exception. Two pushcart food vendors-one engaged in the sale of hot dogs
and the other an ice cream vendor-had operated in the
Vieux Carre for 20 or more years and therefore qualified
under the "grandfather clause" and continued to operate
there. The Q_ourt of Ap ~ls recognized the "City
Council's legitimate authority generally to regulate business conducted on the public streets and sidewalks of the
Vieux Carre in order to preserve the appearance and
custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive
to tourists," 501 F. 2d, at 709, but nevertheless found
that e Council's justification for ' the '7i' randfather~x
ception was "insu Cien to support the discrimination
impose<r' and thus deprived appellee of equal protection.
!d., at 711. Stating expressly that this Court's decision
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957) , was "our chief
guide in resolving this case," 501 F. 2d, at 710, the Court
of Appeals focused on the "exclusionary character" of the
ordinance and its concomitant "creation of a protected
monopoly for the favored class member." I d., at 712713. The "pivotal defect" in the statutory scheme was
perceived to be the fact that the favored class members
need not "continue to operate in a manner more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter than would
any other operator," id., at 711, and the fact that there
was no reason to believe that length of operation "instills
in the [favored] licensed vendors (or their likely transient operators) the kind of appreciation for the conservation of the Quarter's tradition" that would cause their
operations to. beco:tne or remain consistent with that
tradition. I d., at 712. Because these factors demonstrated the "insubstantiality of the relation between the
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nature of the discrimination and the legitimate governmental interest in conserving the traditional assets of
the Vieux Carre," id., at 713, the ordinance was declared
violative of Equal Protection as applied and the case was
remanded for a determination of the severability of the
"grandfather clause" from the remainder of the ordinance.
The court also expressed the view that alternative measures such as regulation of the location or appearance of
pushcarts would be rational, given the city's purported
objectives in enacting the ordinance. Ibid.

I
The question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear the
appeal need detain us only briefly. 28 U. S. C. § 1254
(2) grants jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts
of appeals
"By appeal by a party relying on a State Statute
held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States . .. ."
A municipal ordinance is a "State Statute" for purposes
of this provision. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U. S. 922, 927 n. 2 (1975); United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Ideal Cement Co. , 369 U. S. 134 (1962). See also,
e. g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967); Chicago v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co ., 357 U. S. 77
(1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489
(1958) .
However, it is argued that the Court of Appeals'
decision is not "final" under the doctrine enunciated in
Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929) (predecessor
statute to § 1254 (2)) , and South Carolina Electric &
Gas Co . v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956) (per curiam) ,
since the Court of Appeals, although finding the statute
unconstitutional as applied, remanded the case to the:
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District Court for a determination as to the severability
of the "grandfather provision." There may be some
question as to the continuing vitality of the "finality"
requirement in the context of § 1254 (2), which unlike
such jurisdictional statutes as 28 U. S. C. § 1257 and
28 U. S. C. § 1291 has no "finality" provision in the
statute itself., See, e. g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra,
422 U. S., at 927; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe R. Co., supra, 357 U. S., at 82-83. But without
resolving that question, we believe that any "finality"
test is met under the facts of this case.
The unconstitutionality of the ordinance, in its application to appellee, has been definitely and finally adjudicated by the Court of Appeals, and only a state law
question remains to be decid~d on remand-whether the
s'tatute will be totally invalidated or whether only its
"grandfather provision" will be struck down. There is
no federal, much less constitutional, question which is
yet to be resolved below, and the policy underlying§ 1254
(2)-ensuring that state laws are not erroneously invali·dated-will in no way be served by further delay in
. adjudicating the constitutional issue presented. Moreover, since the outcome of the severability question will
not moot a difficult constitutional issue in this case, the
policy of avoiding needless constitutional decisions would
not be furthered by staying our hand. Furthermore, to
the extent any "finality" requirement in the context of
~ 1254 (2) might be premised on the policies of avoidingpiecemeal appeals or the rendering of advisory opinions,
neither difficulty is likely to eventuate in this case; even
if we were to uphold the Court of Appeals' remand for
a determination of the severability of the "grandfather
provision" under state law, the ruling on remand is not
one which would be subject to further review in this
Court.. On the other hand, a decision by this Court
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rejecting the constitutional challenge to the statute will
obviate the need for further proceedings and bring to a
halt the continued disruption of the city's internal economic affairs. Cf. generally, e. g., Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476-478, 480, 485-486
(1975). We accordingly hold that this appeal is properly before us under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) . We therefore turn to the merits.

II
The record makes abundantly clear that the amended
ordinance, including the "grandfather provision," is solely
l@ economic regulation aimed at enhancing the vital role
of the F:r:ench Quarter's tourist-oriented charm in the
economy of New Orleans.
When local economic regulation is challenged solely
as violating the"'E'qual!'rotection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the
desirability of particular statutory discriminations. See,
e. g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U. S. 356 (1973). Unless the regulation trammels fun- )
damental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that they be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and . .. rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 374 (1974). States are accorded wide latitude in
the regulation of their local economies under their police
powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step-by-step, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966 ) , in such economic
a:r:eas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination
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of the evil to future regulations. See, e. g., Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488-489 (1955). In
short, the judiciary may not sit as a su erlegislature to
judge the wisdom or es1rability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines, see, e. g.,
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423
(1952), Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
U. S. (1976); in the local economic sphere, it is
only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary
act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S.
726, 732 (1963). 5
The Court of Appeals held in this case, howev;:{ ~~~~ the "grandfather provision" failed even thejtest fimw~
~.
We disagree. The Court of Appeals
recognized that the city had identified its objective in
enacting the provision as a means "to preserve the
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents
Ferguson presented an analogous situation. There is a Kansas
statute excepted lawyers from the prohibition of a statute making
it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt
adjusting. We held that the exception of lawyers was not a denial
of equal protection, stating, 372 U. S., at 532 :
"Nor is the statute's exception of lawyers a denial of equal protection of the laws to nonlawyers. Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection of the laws; it is only
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution. . . . If
the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it."
We emphasize again that these principles, of course, govern only
when no constitutional provision other than the Equal Protection
Clause itself is apposite. Vcry different prmciples govern even
economic regulation when constitutional provisions such as the
Commerce Clause a.re Implicated, or when local regulation is
challenged under the Supremacy Clause as inconsistent with relevant federal laws or tnnties.
5

I
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and attractive to tourists." 501 F. 2d, at 709. The
legitimacy of that objective is obvious. The city council
plainly could further that objective by making the reasoned judgment that street peddlers and hawkers tend
to interfere with the charm and beauty of an historic
area and disturb tourists and disrupt their enjoyment of
that charm and beauty, and that such vendors in the
Vieux Carre, the heart of the city's tourist industry,
might thus have a deleterious effect on the economy of
the city. They therefore determined that to ensure the
economic vitality of that area, such businesses should be
substantially curtailed in the Vieux Carre, if not totally
banned.
It is suggested that the "grandfather provision," allowing the continued operation of some vendors without
Jl ~.,.__;
limiting the number of permits they could obtain, was a
.J.t.._~Jd k : ~
totally arbitrary and irrational method of achieving the
J;P t..k
tpvz_...
city's purpose. But rather than proceeding by the imme~- t.h.• cf.n .t.~" 1(../diate and absolute abolition of all pushcart food vendors,
A<JJ ch [L....,t._Luv
the city could rationally choose initially to eliminate
ct..t<..d./JLJ..IW
vendors of more recent vintage. It was suggested on
~
~N~T
oral argument that the city will probably ultimately
~
fk
eliminate even the two vendors that qualified under the
-f. LJ.M.a-1 uJ "grandfather provision." This gradual approach to the
'/!,~lA..Jl~J_L; ~lit_, problem is not constitutionally impermissible. The gov(~· .iJ 1 _
erning constitutional principle was stated in Katzenbach
v.J.:I-o...fd..J-v ~
v. Morgan, supra, at 657 :

;u-

L

J:/ [~ ~~'t -lj_o.:/
w. dl..t.~ 0. l.J.f!L)
tdfJAV~

L

" • .. we are guided by the familiar principles that
a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,"
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339, that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,~
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610, and
that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phrase of the problem which seems;

OJU

o.JJeuiaf.t-d ,~\~

Utt~0._(_'J__

L:::;:LWt

i1
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most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489."
.::_.-r~._u
.__t:)

. A.V

._,.v~

J.:d~~yu/

~ 1/
, ..

The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses
were less likely to have built up substantial reliance
interests in continued operation in the Vieux Carre and
that the two vendors which qualified under the "grandfather clause"-both of which had operated in the area
for over 20 years rather than only eight-had themselves
become part of the distinctive character and charm that
distinguishes the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these
judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.
Appellee contends that the ordinance "eliminates"
rather than "regulates" business, and that the city's arguments concerning economic vitality and the charm and
beauty of the Vieux Carre are simply feigned; the "real"
intent of the city council is said to be the creation of a
legislative monopoly in favor of a particular concern.
But we decline to assess statutory distinctions by determining whether the law "eliminates" or "regulates," cf.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra, at 732, or to invalidate rational economic legislation on the basis of presumed improper motivation. There is no reason to presume that
the monopoly effectively created by the ordinance was
not merely the temporary and incidental effect of a partial ban on street vendors which was designed to serve
other purposes and which will eventually become a total
ban. But even if the city created a permanent monopoly, that would not alter the applicable equal protection
standard, or subject the discrimination to more careful
scrutiny. Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra. There is nothing
in the Equal Protection Clause which denies a city the
option of establishing a monopoly if the city rationally
believes that reduced competition will benefit it economically by preventing an unsightly and bothersome prolifer-
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ation of street vendors, thereby fostering increased tourism. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 527-530
(1934). Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the fact
that other regulation-such as limits on the number of
permits-could accomplish the same legitimate objective
does not mean that the Constitution requires New
Orleans to adopt one rational alternative rather than
another merely because judges regard one to be the
wiser or otherwise preferable choice; such policy decisions in the purely economic realm are properly committed to more representative bodies of our Federal and
State Governments. And to the extent due process
procedural safeguards might attend the selection of the
party that will be the beneficiary of any such stateauthorized grant of monopoly that might rationally be
established, appellee makes no argument that there was
a denial of procedural due process during the creation or
modification of the city's permit scheme. 6
Nevertheless, relying on Morey v. Doud, supra, as its
"chief guide," the Court of Appeals held that even though
the exemption of the two vendors was rationally related to
legitimate city interests on the basis of facts extant when
the ordinance was amended, the "grandfather clause"
still could not stand because "the hypothesis that a
present eight-year veteran of the pushcart hot dog market
in the Viex Carre will continue to operate in a manner
more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter
than would any other operator is without founda6

Although appellee in her complaint asserted that the ordinance
denied her due process, it appears from the record that this was
a substantive due process claim concerning a nonfundamental right.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S., at 729-732, finally interred such
claims. The Court of Appeals did not address any due process
issues, and appellee made no claim in her briefs or at oral argument
of any infirmity in the procedures by which the permit scheme was
promulgated or implemented.
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tion." 501 F. 2d, at 711. Since the city has not imposed
specific requirements that current operational methods or
particular standards be maintained by the beneficiaries
of the "grandfather clause," or that they not seek an
increased number of permits, the Court of Appeals concluded that the classification was arbitrary and irrational
and therefore unconstitutional. But there was no evidence in the record that elimination of more recent vendors has caused any such changes. In any event, we
repeat, legislatures need not regulate currently to meet
all future contingencies, and the constitutionality of such
economic regulation cannot be impugned merely because
some speculative future developments might cause the
regulation to outlive its usefulness or render it irrational.
The city can take account of such changed conditions if
and when they occur. Actually, the reliance on the statute's potential irrationality in Morey v. Doud, as the dis·
:renters in that case correctly pointed out, see 354 U. S.,
at 474-475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), was a needlessly
intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative
powers, and we have concluded that the equal protection
analysis empfoyed m that opinion shoula no longer b
fo lowe .
orey was e
y case m the last ha century to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on
equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that
the decision misapplied the . ra~ional relationship test.
Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly
recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case/

I

7 Since it was known that there were only two vendors eligible
for the benefits of the "grandfather provision,, and since the legislation as enacted would not permit alteration of the closed class
without subsequent legislation, there is no analytical difference
between this case and Morey, where the beneficiary of the legislative exception was specifically named. The Illinois statute invali·
dated in Morey excepted American Express Company from the
Illinois statute that licensed and regulated currency exchanges
engaged in the business of issuing or selling money orders.
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but the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation
that it should be, and it is, overruled.
The judgment of the C6urt of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

.ju.vrtmt <!}curt cf t4t ~nittb .jt~dts
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 28, 1976

Re:

No. 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference

,,

/

To:

From:
Re:

LFP

CRS
New Orleans v. Dukes, No. 74-77S
Your conference vote was to affirm CAS, but you indicated

that you

~~

probably would not dissent from a reversal.

On that

basis I think you can join this opinion.
My principal reason for thinking this case could not be
reversed was that the statute we are considering has been amended
to make the grandfather clause exclusmon applicable to an area
wider than the Vieux Carre.

It seemed to me that we could not

affixm uphold the validity of a statute that was no longer on the
books

~KXKXKMKKMXXKX

was moot;

In a sense the controversy as to that statute

further, since the statute had changed and the parties

had not addressed it, the only reasons articulated for the statute
'by the City dealt with the Vieux Carre only, not the wider area
now cove red.
My views on that matter stemmed from my XKR understanding from
the CAS opinion that only declaratory and injunctive relief had
been sought.
defendant.

But Dukes also sought damages against the individual
Thus, the validity of the old statute must be ae«iaHa

decided in this case, withdrawing any"mootness" related problems
and making XX relevant the articulated reasons advanced by the
City.
The question therefore becomes the validity of those reasons.
That is pretty much an arguable case, as NMK we both have felt
all along.

Brennan's opinion manages to make the statute sound

just about as rational as possible and does no damage to the
developing "articulated reasons" jurisprudence of the Court. ~

OnX that score, I might note that the opinion does not do all that
it might MXM have to make clear whatH the City argued and
what the Court is hypothesizi?9 ' which is really very little.
But it doesn't do

anythin~1gest

that the Court will create

rationales and justifications for statutes.

Thus, the opinion

is consistent with your stand on articulated reasons.
The foregoing all leads me to conclude thwt you can
join despite your conference vote.

JMJ

If you want to adhere to your

conference vote we could attack the rationality of tre statute
with some force.
limitations on
Vieux Carre.

«

(Basically, the complaint is that there are no
how Lucky Dog comports its business in the

But some of the force of these arguments was taken

away at oral argument with the suggestion that all vendors might
be eliminated eventually.

If that KK is the City's plan, failing

to restrict Lucky Dogs for the time being is not really so significant.

Since Brennan makes the most of this, our counter

rationality arguments

~KXXKMH

would sound thinner than they

otherwise would.)
On the big strategic picture, I must admit some surprise to
Brennan's

a~~x~ak

approach here, which is basically a real roll-

XM over-and-play-dead one in economic regulation cases.

This

might not be totally consistent with your view that equal protection analysis outside the "suspect classes"should beX more
than minimal.

But there is nothing satd KKK that's inconsistent with

your view--it's more a matter of toneo

1

My one carp is that at p.
suspect classification.

b._Mhe

refers to '~alienage" as a

Who knows what alienage is?

You might want

but I think KKKMX there is enough support in the cases to sustain it-depending on the alienage cases now being written.

.§u:prttnt ~o-ttrl .of fire ~b $)ta.trs
~IUlfri:n.gLm. ~.
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CHA"''BERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 4, 1976

,.

Re:

74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes

!
~

Dear Bi 11:
I am generally with you, but I cannot join
saying that alienage is a "suspect classification".
I can no longer go along with these "litmus" words.
In short, I can easily be

11

had".

Regards,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

..

T~Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Just'ce Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice l1lrshall
Mr · Just co Blackmun /
Mr. Jur,t~.co Pove 1v
7··
Mr. ,Jt tl,...o r:o-.Jhnquis
Mr. Justice SLeve s
From: The Chief Justice
Circulated:

Re:

APR 1 4 1976

Recirculated:
74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes

-------

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring.
I join the (proposed) opinion of the Court overruling Morey v.
Doud, supra, essentially because I believe that case was wrongly
decided for the reasons expressed at the time by Justices Black,
Frankfurter and Harlan.

The political branches of government must

have wide scope in regulating commercial activity, and whether the

.,

choices made by the city government here are wise and sound, or the
contrary, it is not the function of judges to reassess them on the basis
of the Equal Protection Clause.

\
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CHAMI!IERS O F"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 15, 1976

Re:

74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes

Dear Bill:
On further reflection I think I will withdraw
my concurring opinion and concur in the judgment.

I

have other problems with the opinion itself but prefer
not to add to the literature with more writing.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

a}ourlltf t4t ~b j\taltg
:Jfas4ittghtn, ~. (!}. 20~~~
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CHAM!!lERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 16, 1976

Re:

/

74-775 - New Orleans v. Dukes

Dear Bill:
I join your opinion as modified.

If you can "swallow''

it, why not sign as originally?
Regards,

LJ\ (')
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

',
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C HA M BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

/

June 16, 1976

Re:

No. 74-775 - New Orleans v. Dukes

Dear Bill:
Pl e ase join me in your revised•circulation. I agree
with Potter and the Chief that it should be a signed opinion
unless you prefer otherwise.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Confere nce

.
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City of New Orleans et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeal from the United
States Court of Appeals
v.
for the Fifth Circuit.
Nancy Dukes, db a Louisiana Concessions.
[January -, 1976]
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CeHFt.-

The question presented by this case is whether the
provision of a New Orleans ordinance, as amended in
1972, that excepts from the ordinance's prohibition
against vendors' selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in
the Vieux Carre, or French Quarter, "vendors who have
continually operated the same business within the Vieux
Carre ... for eight years prior to January 1, 1972 . . ."
denied appellee vendor equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
Appellee operates a vending business from pushcarts
throughout New Orleans but had carried on that business in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the
ordinance was amended in 1972 and barred her from
The pertinent provision of the New Orleans ordinance, c. 46,
§§ 1 and 1.1 of the Code of the City of New Orleans, as amended
August 31, 1972, provides :
"Vendors who have continuously operated the same business within
the Vieux Carre under the authority of this Chapter for eight
or more years prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a valid permit
to operate such busmess within the Vieux Carre."
1

~ f.&•e ,(, ~

~~

~~
i-

~
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continuing operations there. 2 She had previously filed
an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana attacking the validity of the former version
of the ordinance, 8 and amended her complaint to challenge the application of the ordinance's "grandfather
clause"-the eight years or more provision-as a denial
of equal protection. She prayed for an injunction and
declaratory judgment. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the District Court, without opinion, granted
appellant city's motion. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed. 501 F. 2d 706 (1974). We
postponed the question of this Court's jurisdiction to a
hearing on the merits, 421 U. S. 908 (1975). We hold
that we have jurisdiction of appellant's appeal, and on
the merits reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Vieux Carre--the "French Quarter"-of the city
of New Orleans is the heart of that city's considerable
tourist industry and an integral component of the city's
economy. 4 The sector plays a special role in the city's
life, and pursuant to the Louisiana State Constitution,
c. 8 of Art. V of the City's Home Rule Charter grants
the New Orleans City Council power to enact ordinances
designed to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and
economic viability
Chapter 46 of the Code of the City of New Orleans sets
up a comprehensive scheme of permits for the conduct
of various businesses in the city. In 1972, the Code was
amended to restrict the validity of many of these per2
Most of appellee's sales, particularly during the sununer months,
were made m the Vieux Carre.
8
Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343
(3) (4), and 2201-2202. The Equal ProtectiOn violation was alleged
to constitute a vwlation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985.
4
See generally App. Vol. II, at 31-63 (Excerpts from Comprehensive Study Plan for the Vieux Carre Under a Demonstration
Grant from Department of Housmg and Urban Development).
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mits to points outside the Vieux Carre. However, even
as to those occupations-including all pushcart food
vendors-which were to be banned from the Vieux Carre
during seasons other than Mardi Gras, the city council
made the /(grandfather provision" exception. Two pushcart food vendors-one engaged in the sale of hot dogs
and the other an ice cream vendor-had operated in the
Vieux Carre for 20 or more years and therefore qualified
under the /(grandfather clause" and continued to operate
there. The Court of Appeals recognized the ucity
Council's legitimate authority generally to regulate business conducted on the public streets and sidewalks of the
Vieux Carre in order to preserve the appearance and
custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive
to tourists," 501 F. 2d, at 709, but nevertheless found
that the Council's justification for the /(grandfather" exception was /(insufficient to support the discrimination
imposed" and thus deprived appellee of equal protection.
/d., at 711. Stating expressly that this Court's decision
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957), was uour chief
guide in resolving this case," 501 F. 2d, at 710, the Court
of Appeals focused on the /(exclusionary character" of the
ordinance and its concomitant ucreation of a protected
monopoly for the favored class member." I d., at 712713. The upivotal defect" in the statutory scheme was
perceived to be the fact that the favored class members
need not ucontinue to operate in a manner more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter than would
any other operator," id., at 711, and the fact that there
was no reason to believe that length of operation /(instills
in the [favored] licensed vendors (or their likely transient operators) the kind of appreciation for the conservation of the Quarter's tradition" that would cause their
operations to become or remain consistent with that
tradition. Id., at 712. Because these factors demonstrated the /(insubstantiality of the relation between the
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nature of the discrimination and the legitimate governmental interest in conserving the traditional assets of
the Vieux Carre," id., at 713, the ordinance was declared
violative of Equal Protection as applied and the case was
remanded for a determination of the severability of the
"grandfather clause" from the remainder of the ordinance.
urt also expressed the view that alternative measthe location or appearance of
ures such as reg
ushcarts would be rational, given
r orted
objectives in enactin the ordinance.

I
The question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear the
appeal need detain us only briefly. 28 U. S. C. § 1254
(2) grants jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts
of appeals
"By appeal by a party relying on a State Statute
held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States . . .."
A municipal ordinance is a "State Statute" for purposes
of this provision. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U. S. 922, 927 n. 2 (1975); United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Ideal Cement Co. , 369 U. S. 134 (1962). See also,
e. g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967); Chicago v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 357 U. S. 77
(1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489
(1958).
However, it is argued that the Court of Appeals'
decision is not "final" under the doctrine enunciated in
Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929) (predecessor
statute to § 1254 (2)) , and South Carolina Electric &
Gas Co . v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 '(1956) (per curiam) ,
since the Court of Appeals, although finding the statute
unconstitutional as applied, remanded the case to th~
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District Court for a determination as to the severability
of the "grandfather provision." There may be some
question as to the continuing vitality of the "finality"
requirement in the context of § 1254 (2), which unlike
such jurisdictional statutes as 28 U. S. C. § 1257 and
28 U. S. C. § 1291 has no "finality" provision in the
statute itself., See, e. g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra,
422 U. S., at 927; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe R. Co., supra, 357 U. S., at 82-83. But without
resolving that question, we believe that any "finality"
test is met under the facts of this case.
The unconstitutionality of the ordinance, in its application to appellee, has been definitely and finally adjudicated by the Court of Appeals, and only a state law
question remains to be decid~d on remand-whether the
statute will be totally invalidated or whether only its
"grandfather provision" will be struck down.. There is
no federal, much less constitutional, question which is
yet to be resolved below, and the policy underlying § 1254
(2)-ensuring that state laws are not erroneously invali·dated-will in no way be served by further delay in
adjudicating the constitutional issue presented. Moreover, since the outcome of the severability question will
not moot a difficult constitutional issue in this case, the
policy of avoiding needless constitutional decisions would
not be furthered by staying our hand. Furthermore, to
the extent any "finality" requi~ement in the context of
§ 1254 (2) might be premised on the policies of avoiding
piecemeal appeals or the rendering of advisory opinions,
neither difficulty is likely to eventuate in this case; even
if we were to uphold the Court of Appeals' remand for
a determination of the severability of the "grandfather
provision" under state law, the ruling on remand is not
one which would be subject to further review in this
Court.. On the other hand, a decision by this Court
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rejecting the constitutional challenge to the statute will
obviate the need for further proceedings and bring to a
halt the continued disruption of the city's internal econf'mic affairs. Cf. generally, e. g., Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476-478, 480, 485-486
(1975). We accordingly hold that this appeal is properly before us under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) . We therefore turn to the merits.
II
The record makes abundantly clear that the amended
ordinance, including the "grandfather provision," is solely
an economic regulation aimed at enhancing the vital role
of the French Quarter's tourist-oriented charm in the
economy of New Orleans.
When local economic regulation is challenged solely
as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the
desirability of particular statutory discriminations. See,
e. g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
7
U. S. 356 (1973). Unless thQ X:'ilgwla.bawt:_.:r:.a;:
mm
:....::;e.;;.ls~fu~n.:;:--r~-a.-cr~--:.7ft,....~
· ~~-:
.:-damental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently
~
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,
,
.n
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statu-

or~y~d~is~c~rnot
i~·m;i~n~a~
ti~·o~n:s~a;nlld~re~u~i~re~o~njly~tgh~at~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~
r~t~sonable,
arbitrary, and ... rest upon some
~ k
of difference having a fair an
·
a wn to the
object of t
· a Ion." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
, 4 (1~74) ) ta es are accorded wide atitude in
the regulation of their local economies under their police
powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step-by-step, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in such economic
areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination.

~ctl~ ~
-h:> o. ~~-~~
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of the evil to future regulations.

7

See, e. g., Williamson

v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488-489 (1955). In

a

~

short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines, see, e. g.,
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423
(1952)~ M€hBBftehtt8tJUB }ijgg,rfi ef Reti,, e1ne1tt v. ll!l1trgia,
U. g,
(1Q76);. in the local economic sphere, it is
only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary
act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S.
726, 732 (1963). 5
The Court of Appeals held in this case, however, that
the "grandfather provision" failed even the test.6t--Ht.J~""
mal scr ubi~ We disagree.
Cour of Appeals
recognized that the city had identifiede_ts o Jective m
enac mg the provision, as a means "to ~reserve the
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents
5 Ferguson presented an analogous situation.
There is a Kansas
statute excepted lawyers from the prohibition of a statute making
it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt
adjusting. We held that the exception of lawyers was not a denial
of equal protection, stating, 372 U.S., at 532 :
"Nor is the statute's exception of lawyers a denial of equal protection of the laws to nonlawyers. Statutes create many classifications which do not deny equal protection of the laws; it is only
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution. . . . If
the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it."
We emphasize again that these principles, of course, govern only
when no constitutional provision other than the Equal Protection
Clause itself is apposite. Very different principles govern even
economic regulation when constitutional provisions such as the
Commerce Clause are implicated, or when local regulation is
challenged under the Supremacy Clause as inconsistent with relevant federal laws or t:rmties.

o_

'----======------::::---,
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and attractive to tourists." 501 F. 2d, at 709. The
legitimacy of that objective is obvious. The city council
plainly could further that objective by making the reasoned judgment that street peddlers and hawkers tend
to interfere with the charm and beauty of an historic
area and disturb tourists and disrupt their enjoyment of
that charm and beauty, and that such vendors in the
Vieux Carre, the heart of the city's tourist industry,
might thus have a deleterious effect on the economy of
the city. They therefore determined that to ensure the
economic vitality of that area, such businesses should be
substantially curtailed in the Vieux Carre, if not totally
banned.

cause it might have gone farther than it did,'
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339·, that a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,"
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610, and
that 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phrase of the problem which seems;
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most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489."
The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses
were less likely to have built up substantial reliance
interests in continued operation in the Vieux Carre and
that the two vendors which qualified under the "grandfather clause"-both of which had operated in the area
for over 20 years rather than only eight-had themselves
become part of the distinctive character and charm that
distinguishes the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these
judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection.
Appe ee con en s
a
e ordinance "eliminates"
r er than "regulates" business, and that the city's arguments ncerning economic vitality and the charm and
beauty of e Vieux Carre are simply feigned; the "real"
intent of th city council is said to be the creation of a
legislative m nopoly in favor of a particular concern.
But we declin to assess statutory distinctions by determining whethe the law "eliminates" or "regulates/' cf.
Ferguson v. Skru
supra, at 732, or to invalidate rational economic legis · n on the basis of presumed improper motivation. There · no reason to presume that
the monopoly effectively crea d by the ordinance was
not merely the temporary and in ·dental effect of a partial ban on street vendors which as designed to serve
other purposes and which will even ally become a total
ban. But even if the city created a ermanent monopoly, that would not alter the applicable ual protection
re careful
standard, or subject the discrimination to
scrutiny. Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra. There i nothing
in the Equal Protection Clause which denies a ity the
option of establishing a monopoly if the city ra ionally
believes that reduced competition will benefit it ec omically by preventi~g an unsightly and bothersome pro
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ation of street vendors, thereby fostering increased tour
ism. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 527- 0
(1934). Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view,
fact
that other regulation-such as limits on the
mber of
permits-could accomplish the same legitim
objective
does not mean that the Constitution equires New
Orleans to adopt one rational alter. ive rather than
another merely because judges gard one to be the
wiser or otherwise preferable
oice; such policy decisions in the purely econo ·c realm are properly committed to more represe ative bodies of our Federal and
State Governments And to the extent due process
procedural safegu ds might attend the selection of the
party that wi be the beneficiary of any such stateant of monopoly that might rationally be
authorize
estabr ed, appellee makes no argument that there was
a
ial of procedural due process during the creation or
odifi
ermit scheme. 6
Nevertheless, relying on Morey v. Doud, supra, as 1 s
"chief guide," the Court of Appeals held that even though
the exemption of the two vendors was rationally related to
legitimate city interests on the basis of facts extant when
the ordinance was amended, the "grandfather clause"
still could not stand because "the hypothesis that a
present eight-year veteran of the pushcart hot dog market
in the Viex Carre will continue to operate in a manner
more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter
than would any other operator is without founda-.-....oa.~J:W.~J.g,C._5appellee

in her complaint asserted that the ordinance
denied her due
ess, it appears from the record that this was
a substantive due proce
aim concerning a nonfundamental right.
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. .,
9-732, finally interred such
claims. The Court of Appeals did not
an due process
issues, and appellee made no claim in her briefs or at or c
of any infirmity in the procedures by which the permit scheme was
promulgated or implemented.
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tion." 501 F. 2d at 711. Since the city has not imposed
spec
reqUirements that current operational methods
particular standards be maintained by the benefic· 1es
of the "grandfather clause," or that they no eek an
increased number of permits, the Court of
peals conand irrational
cluded that the classification was arbitr
and therefore unconstitutional.
on of more recent vendors has caused any such
anges. In any event, we
repeat, legislatures ne not regulate currently to meet
all future continge 'es, and the constitutionality of such
economic regul · n cannot be impugned merely because
some spec
ive future developments might cause the
regula · n to outlive its usefulness or render it irrational.
T city can take account of such changed conditions if
d when the oc
c ua
esa ute's potential irrationality in Morey v. Doud, as the dissenters in that case correctly pointed out, see 354 U. S.,
at 474-475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), was a needlessly
intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative
powers, and we have concluded that the equal protection
analysis employed in that opinion should no longer be
followed. Morey was the only case in the last half century to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on
equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that
the decision misapplied the rational relationship test.
Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly
recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case/
· ce it was known t at there were only two vendors eligible
for the be ts of the "grandfather provision, " and since the legislation as enac
would not permit alteration of the closed class
ion, there is no analytical difference
without subsequen
between this case and Morey, w
the beneficiary of the legislative exception was speci.fically named.
· ois statute invali·
dated in Morey excepted American Express Com
fr m the
Illinois statute that licensed and regulated currency exchang
engaged in the business of issuing or selling money orders.
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but the decision so far departs from proper equal protection analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation
that it should be, and it is, overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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June 21. 1976

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

I

Re: No. 74-775 -- City of New Orleans v. Nancy Dukes

Dear Bill:
Please add to your Per Curiam. "Mr. Justice
Marshall joins in the judgment."
Sincerely.

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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